yes louis vuitton Aesthetic Internalism and two normative puzzles
One of the most discussed views in metaethics is Moral Internalism, according to which there is a conceptually necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation to act. Moral Internalism is regarded to yield the prime argument against Moral Cognitivism and for Moral Non Cognitivism. In this paper, I investigate the significance of the corresponding claim in metaaesthetics. I pursue two lines of argument. First, I argue that Aesthetic Internalism the view that there is a conceptually necessary connection between aesthetic value judgments and motivation to act is mistaken. It follows, I maintain, that the most important argument against Aesthetic Cognitivism,
and for Aesthetic Non Cognitivism, is flawed, and that the latter view presumably is incorrect. Second, I argue that considerations with regard to Aesthetic Internalism give rise to two normative puzzles with relevance for the normative domain in general. The most plausible solution to these puzzles entails, I maintain, that we need to revise the established view about normative judgments. Moreover,
I propose a novel externalist account of aesthetic value judgments.